Human Development Foundation

PROJECT PAKISTAN

The Human Development Foundation of North America (HDFNA) was registered in 1997 in USA as a charitable foundation with the aim of launching "an apolitical movement for positive social change and community empowerment through mass literacy, enhanced quality of education, primary health care, and grassroots economic development".  Initial financial contributions to the Foundation came from three organizations: the Noor Foundation, the Society for International HELP (Health, Education, and Literacy Programs), and the Association of Pakistani Physicians in North America (APPNA). Subsequent contributions have come from a set of 'founding members', who provided donations of $10,000 each.  HDFNA has a 21-member board, drawn from all over North America. The founding members, the board of governors as well as the principal members of the three financial supporters of the new organizations are Pakistani Americans, and mainly Pakistani American physicians. Given this, as well as the fact that Pakistan is one of the most impoverished countries in human development terms, a major goal of the organization is to initiate a program of integrated human development in Pakistan.

The purpose of this paper is to translate this broad goal into a feasible program, and to outline the steps required for putting this program into action. The first step in this process is to articulate the overall vision and long term strategy of the program. This will establish the frame within which short-term actions may be planned and implemented, and also help generate a discussion of the impact that HDFNA proposes to create over the long-term. In particular, it must be noted that it is not difficult to build a school or a medical establishment in Pakistan. What is difficult is to create a program that will on the one hand sustain itself over the long run, and on the other hand provide a model for replication and imitation. The goal is not merely to create infrastructure (although some infrastructure is needed), nor only to provide certain service or services for a limited period by providing money. The goal rather is create capacity in the society for a sustained response to problems.

This section seeks precisely to spell out a vision of such a sustained and innovative program. This is done on the basis of discussions with HDFNA board members (including a presentation and discussion during the HDFNA Executive Board meeting in Toronto, April 1998), potential partners of HDFNA, and our own experience of working with NGOs in Pakistan and elsewhere. The question of overall vision can be stated in the form of a question.

Clearly, the first requirement for such a program is that it should itself be sustainable. In other words, it should be able to continue to mobilize human, financial, and social resources for as much time as is necessary to sustain the impact. Second, it should have the ingredients required to make it self sustaining, i.e. as something that will not require the permanent injection of external resources. Third, it should have the capacity to spread beyond its limited area of operation--through expansion, imitation, replication, and partnership. Fourth, it should build upon existing efforts instead of trying to replace them. For all of this to happen, the program must be such that all relevant constituencies--donors as well as activists, governments as well NGOs, beneficiaries as well as service providers--will consider it to be potentially successful and worthy of their support. In other words, it must command broad legitimacy amongst these constituencies--in Pakistan as well as North America.

In the long-term perspective, HDFNA is faced with a fairly wide array of choices. However, everything that is possible is neither necessarily desirable nor even feasible. Indeed, the surest recipe for failure is to yield to the populist temptation of trying to be everything for everyone. In order to narrow the field to what is feasible and desirable, the question to be asked is what would make the program legitimate, and thus ensure support as well as sustainability.

1.1 · Legitimacy of Intervention

Legitimacy is a complex idea. In simple terms it means acceptance by relevant constituencies, and thus support, synergy, and sustainability. The sources of acceptance are varied. They depend on the interests of the individuals involved as well as the nature of the program in question. Some individuals are interested only in precise and measurable outcomes (e.g., most stockholders are interested only in the value of their stock) and they will generally look for efficiency and expertise as the defining characteristics of legitimacy. Others are interested in more complex (and often not precisely measurable) outcomes, such as equity, empowerment, and capacity, and may therefore take a broader view of legitimacy.

The nature of legitimacy varies also with the nature of the program. Most people regard the legitimacy of narrow programs--those that operate in clearly demarcated areas, and where the main problems are technical in nature--on expertise alone. Thus, most would agree that the best engineers be hired to build a bridge, or the best surgeon to perform a delicate operation. In contrast, most reasonable people would also agree that the legitimacy of social interventions rests on broader considerations. In such programs the problems are rarely exclusively technical in nature, they often involve competing perceptions, conflicting interests, and a diversity of social outcomes. Factors besides technical expertise, such as social commitment and social relevance also acquire importance. To give a simple counter-example, although the IMF has the resources to mobilize the best technical "economists" in the world, most people in the third world consider its role and advice to be seriously flawed, socially retrogressive, politically biased, and on balance harmful.

HDFNA must always keep in mind its legitimacy with the two constituencies between which it seeks to build a bridge. These are on the one hand the active as well as contributing members of the foundation in North America, and on the other hand the proposed beneficiaries and their partners in Pakistan. These are of course very broad categories and each covers a vast range of interests and expectations. One could be more precise and divide these groups into a larger number of categories--for example by distinguishing between NGOs, governmental organizations, and other activists in the broader civil society--but for the present purposes the broad division is sufficient.

Two sets of factors are of interest in examining the legitimacy with regard to the first constituency. The first, which is shared by all members, is the effectiveness of the manner in which resources are used. The second is the nature of the process, namely whether it engenders or obstructs participation and empowerment, and builds capacity over the long run. These are matters that will be of more interest to members who can devote their own time and energy (besides financial contributions) to the effort. In contrast, those who can only contribute financial resources are more likely to be interested in verifiable outcomes in the short run--much like stockholders of corporations who do not have the time or the expertise to delve into the workings of the enterprises, and thus can judge the effectiveness of the effort only by reference to the value of the stocks. In an analogous manner, such members must receive information of the direct social benefits produced by the activity supported by them. They would also have an interest presumably in the transparency and effectiveness of the implementation mechanism.

Beyond these requirements, however, the more time people are willing to contribute to the effort, the more interested they would be in the specifics of the program. Here, contribution of time and energy does not necessarily mean spending a block of time in the project area. It covers a range of activities, including a willingness to sit on committees, help with program design, site selection, fundraising, communications, and monitoring and evaluation. The program must be able to find a place for all types of members irrespective of how much time or energy they can contribute to the effort. The second group of people need more information--on conditions in Pakistan, the nature of activities already under way, and details on partnerships and partner institutions. More importantly, they need vehicles through which to contribute directly to the effort.

HDFNA’s programs have to ensure continued support from the primary constituency of members. Equally important is the support and acceptability in Pakistan. Legitimacy in this context is perhaps even more complicated, overlain as it is with the record of earlier interventions.  In order to explore this issue, it would be useful to take a brief look at past experience. This is not the first occasion that individuals who are not normally the residents of Pakistan have tried to act in concert to influence socio-economic change in the country. Such influence was exercised primarily, but not exclusively, by the provision of financial assistance--although in some cases the financial inflows are implicit rather than explicit.

v       Advisory Groups: Two examples are significant. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Harvard Advisory Group was very influential in the determination of policy choices and investment programs. Most recently, the so-called "bankers group", led by a Vice President of Citibank is said to have acquired a similar degree of influence in policy making and institutional reform. Other experiments with independent advice have been domestic (e.g., SDPI and HDC).

v       Multilateral Financial Institutions: Increasingly since the late 1970s, economic policy making has come under the tutelage of the World Bank and IMF in the guise of various programs of structural adjustment.

v       Large Donors: During much of this period, the country received significant bilateral development assistance, especially from three large donors: Germany, Japan, and USAID (only until the end of the 1980s). Although the financial inflows were very large, these programs were not associated with a clear profile or social agenda.

v       Small Bilateral Donors: Several smaller donors also exerted a degree of influence albeit in limited areas (e.g. UNICEF on immunization; Swiss, Norwegian, and Dutch aid organizations on community development; Canadians on environment and energy). These donors tended to be partial towards human and social concerns.

v       International NGOs and Foundations: A similar tendency is evident in the work of leading international NGOs (OXFAM, ActionAid, Save the Children Fund) and non-government foundations: HBF, FES, FNS, KAF, Goethe Institut, the Asia Foundation.

v       The Aga Khan: The Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) supported the celebrated Aga Khan Rural Support Program (AKRSP) in the Northern Areas, the Aga Khan University in Karachi (with its emphasis on community health among other things), and effective but lesser known programs in primary education and health. Although technically the assistance is provided by a charitable foundation (AKF), it is associated closely with the personality of the Aga Khan.

v       BCCI Foundation: The BCCI foundation was set up by the BCCI group, led by the Pakistani banker, Agha Hassan Abedi. It supports a range of philanthropic activities, most notably the Orangi Pilot Project and the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Technology.  Again, while technically the support comes from a charitable foundation, it is associated very closely with a person.

v       Other Donors: These include such organizations as the Hamdard Foundation, the Baqai Foundation, and the National Education Management Fund (which manages LUMS). These locate themselves in the tertiary tier of service provision, and derive their legitimacy from the focused nature of their programs.

What is the retrospective assessment of this experience?  As for pure advice giving groups, popular opinion is almost unanimous in its criticism of the Harvard Group (for providing irresponsible and socially harmful advice), but seems to be more sanguine about the bankers group.  There could be several reasons for the difference. Perhaps most importantly, the Pakistani group might be seen as more responsible than the earlier one, especially because the individuals associated with the group have a social "presence" in Pakistan. Second, this group has limited its advice mainly to the area of its specific expertise (namely the financial sector).  Third, in an important sense, the Harvard Group was seen as having failed in its endeavor, while the jury is still out for the bankers group.  Having said all this, it may be noted that domestic advice giving groups (SDPI and HDC) command broad respect and legitimacy, although they do not have the same closeness to policy makers as the expatriate groups.

Popular assessments of governmental or inter-governmental donors appear to be based both on the nature of their advice and their own characteristics and attributes. In general, large donors with alternative geopolitical agendas are viewed with greater suspicion than smaller ones.  Furthermore, greater criticism is attached to donors whose advice has tended to be socially retrogressive.  For instance, multilateral financial institutions are highly unpopular within the country, and are viewed as socially retrogressive as well as hegemonic.  On the other hand, while bilateral assistance is also often regarded with suspicion, popular as well as expert opinion seems to take a more positive view of the smaller bilateral donors (Swiss, Norwegian, Dutch, and to some extent the Canadians), presumably because they supported more focused and socially egalitarian programs.  International NGOs and Foundations are also regarded favorably for much of the same reasons.

Individual donors have the highest degree of legitimacy. For example, even in a country where religious and sectarian intolerance is growing rapidly, the Aga Khan personally, and the programs supported by him continue to command enormous respect and legitimacy.  However, such the vast majority of scholarly studies on these interventions also endorse these positive assessments. The few recent studies that challenge the positive consensus are very much a minority opinion. 

Similarly, notwithstanding the international BCCI scandal (in which many Pakistani depositors lost money), BCCI initiatives and even Agha Hassan Abedi personally continue to be viewed with considerable respect.  In both cases an important reason is the socially progressive nature of their interventions. Perhaps equally important is the fact that they have a social presence in Pakistan, and are viewed as Pakistanis or honorary Pakistanis.  Finally, the individuals associated with these programs--Shoaib Sultan Khan with AKRSP, Akhter Hameed Khan with OPP--also command widespread respect and legitimacy in their own right. They are generally acknowledged as pioneers in their fields, and as the architects of highly successful programs with well-defined, socially progressive agendas. These programs were able to generate additional resources beyond the initial investment of the principal donor. A major reason for the success is the ability to communicate the lessons and the experiences to the wider public in an effective manner.

This brief and admittedly incomplete review of the legitimacy of donor activity brings out six lessons: first, "Pakistani-ness" matters; second, persons matter; third, the social agenda matters; fourth, cooperation and partnership matters; fifth, success matters; and sixth, communication matters.  By and large, greater legitimacy is associated with Pakistani groups with recognizable names rather than faceless institutions, especially those that pursue socially progressive agendas in which they achieve a degree of success, and are able to inform the public about this success, and those. Finally, a clear focus and well-defined program will have greater legitimacy than a confused or unfocussed one.

As HDFNA sets out its plan of action, it would help if it emphasized the characteristics that can endow it with greater legitimacy. In particular:

v       First, HDFNA must build upon its strengths. These strengths include, first, the ability to mobilize to raise funds from the expatriate Pakistani community; second, the expertise that people in Pakistan would associate with the leaders of the organization; and third, the core elements of the successes of the last decade. This is necessary both to sustain the support of its North American membership, and the legitimacy in the eyes of public and expert opinion in Pakistan.

v       Second, make a conscious decision regarding the image to be projected. It must stress its Pakistani character, the clarity of its goals and vision, its social agenda, and the success it has achieved thus far. It must endeavor to become associated in peoples' minds with individuals who command respect and legitimacy in the country. Currently, HDFNA is viewed by many in Pakistan (especially its prospective partners) mainly as a donor organization. Its own self-image seems to be either that of an agent of social change, or a representative of the expatriate Pakistani community. Finally, in its earlier work in Pakistan, it presented itself as an expert group (of medical specialists) providing technical advice and assistance within the area of their expertise. While all are relevant to the situation in Pakistan, they differ from each other with regard to long term legitimacy, range of impact, and fundraising capacity.

v       Third, base the program on a shared vision of social change. Two broad models of social change have dominated the development landscape in Pakistan. An earlier, government-led model started from the notion of "deprivation" and capital deficiency (too few schools, or factories, or roads, etc.) to propose a (concerted and efficient) investment program for catching up. A more recent model, articulated mainly by civil society groups, relies instead on the idea of "capacity", and works to expand and strengthen the individual and collective abilities of people (especially the poor) to address their needs themselves.

v       Fourth, be explicit on the question of partnership. HDFNA must decide at the outset whether it will act as a self contained unit for delivering certain services or outcomes, or whether it sees itself as part of a broader team of actors engaged in a similar or complementary enterprise. If the latter, its vision must include transparent criteria for selecting partners, and in particular about the basis for collaboration with governmental agencies. This issue is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.

v       Fifth, articulate a strategy for raising financial resources, both by expanding the resource base over the long-term, and leveraging these resources with external sources of funds.

v       Sixth, institutionalize a communication program, aimed at both its constituencies (in Pakistan and abroad). It must establish systems for a periodic assessment of its contribution, and for the dissemination of results to the public. On the one hand, this will help establish the transparency and legitimacy of the intervention and, on the other, create a knowledge-based system that can be improved through a continuous process of learning and error-correction.

The following six sections respond to each of these points.  Our response is based on a review of the relevant documents, interviews with selected individuals from various institutions, knowledge of the successes and failures of human development initiatives in Pakistan, and finally our own experience and assessment of what is likely to be the most productive course of action for HDFNA.

1.2 · Building on strength

Project Pakistan already has a good start, in that it builds upon the pioneering efforts of three founding organizations of HDFNA, namely Noor Foundation, SIH, and APPNA. These organizations have been active in programs of social change in Pakistan for almost a decade. In 1989, APPNA founded a subsidiary organization in Pakistan, APPNA-Sehat, which launched its Village Improvement Project, an innovative program of health education and awareness, in four districts of Pakistan.  SIH has been the primary supporter of its Pakistani counterpart, the Tameer-e-Millat Foundation, which was founded in 1991, and has established a highly successful program of formal and non-formal primary education in two districts in the Punjab.  One goal of HDFNA is to consolidate these efforts into an integrated program.  Another is to ensure that expatriate Pakistanis who wish to invest in the socio-economic transformation of their country of origin have a credible and effective mechanism for channeling their resources.

This effort comes at a time that is both inopportune and opportune. On the one hand there is the erosion of financial support for human development, and indeed development in general because of the fiscal crisis in Pakistan and the dwindling of aid resources (compounded in Pakistan's case, by the imposition of sanctions). This will place unprecedented constraints on the ability to leverage resources into higher amounts.

On the other hand, there is clearly a counter-trend in civil society, within Pakistan as well as in North America, to substitute for governmental human, financial and political resources. In North America, there is an express desire amongst Pakistani Americans to invest in the social conditions of their country of origin; in a sense to repay some of the investment that the country made in their own lives. This trend is consistent with a revival of philanthropy in North America in general.  There are some who argue that things are inching back to the glory days of the turn of the last century when millionaires like John D. Rockefeller, who reputedly started giving at least ten percent of his income even when he was a clerk, donated more than half of his wealth to charitable causes.  Around the same time, Andrew Carnegie wrote, "the man who dies rich dies disgraced."  Although the current generation of the 'super rich' in America seem less generous in their dispensations, a few like Ted Turner and George Soros have been leading the way in nudging them towards a philanthropic revival.  Be that as it may, it is clear that 'Middle America', including its Pakistani component, is giving in greater numbers than ever before.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that Americans of Pakistani origin may be especially eager to contribute something back towards social improvement in Pakistan.

This trend has been matched by a parallel process of social activism and involvement, in other words of “human” investment in social change by actors in civil society in Pakistan. These individuals invest their time and energy in social causes through (unpaid or nominally paid) involvement in NGOs, activist organizations, and other forms of non-partisan social activity. Today, key institutions engaged in social change are no longer associated with the government--although they need a certain degree of support or at least tolerance from the government--and all innovative ideas about such programs are coming from the non-governmental sector. There is an opportunity to marry these two trends, to harness the philanthropic and entrepreneurial energies of the relatively affluent people in North America, and the activist energies of those committed to social goals in Pakistan. HDFNA is well placed to seize this opportunity.

1.3 · Image and Identity

Given the above, we can take a quick look at the issue of identity.  As mentioned, at this moment, HDFNA has a number of options in thinking about its primary identity.  It can think of itself, as many people in Pakistan do so already, as a financial intermediary, which channels resources from individual donors to those who can make the most effective use.  Related to this perception is another identity, namely as the representative of the views and interests of expatriate Pakistanis.  However, its own self-image, which comes out in conversations and founding documents, is entirely different: that of an agent of social change, especially in Pakistan.  Finally, an identity that had been emphasized in its related program of APPNA-Sehat was that of health care professionals, who could bring managerial expertise to bear upon the problems of primary health.

In principle, all of these are useful and indeed necessary components of a composite identity.  However, it is important for the organization to be clear about its primary identity and to make sure that all others respond to the needs dictated by it.  The structure and behavior of the organization will depend on the core identity selected by the organization.  For example, the nature of financial intermediation it provides will vary according to whether financial intermediation is the primary goal, or whether it is subsidiary to the goal of social change. In the latter instance, the financial intermediation will resemble an investor rather than a bank.  In other words, to use financial language, the investment portfolio will not be selected passively (as a bank might do) in order to obtain the greatest (social) returns on the "investment", but rather actively, as a partnership with other actors carrying out the desired functions. The goal of the bank is to minimize the risk; the goal of the investor is to take risks in order to maximize the payoff.

Given the thrust of the earlier discussion on legitimacy, it makes sense to recommend that HDFNA should be clear about its core identity and primary goal: the initiation of social change in Pakistan. Its role as a financial intermediary, as a representative and mobilizer of expatriate Pakistanis, and as a group of experts should cede priority to the core objective.  Indeed, the whole enterprise should be tailored around the primary objective and not around any other objective, however important they might be.

An issue that must be raised here is the relationship between identity and fundraising.  If HDFNA is seen primarily as a financial intermediary, it might limit its ability to raise funds from non-member sources.  For example, a recent request by APPNA-Sehat for funds from a Pakistani donor was rejected on the grounds that since APPNA is a rich organization, it should be giving money rather than asking for money.  HDFNA must make an effort to dispel this impression in order to avoid such problems.

For this purpose, the most obvious remedy is to create a distance between the fundraising role and the implementation role.  One possibility is to set up or identify an independent organization in Pakistan, which would be linked to HDFNA, but also have its own Board of Governors.  The Pakistani body would have an assurance of receiving funds from HDFNA but could also seek funds from other sources.  However, this requires a careful construction of the governance structure of the implementing organization, so that it carries out the envisaged program faithfully.  Some ideas on this recommendation are provided in the chapters that follow.

v       HDFNA should emphasize its Pakistani character, and become associated in peoples’ minds with respected individuals.

v       HDFNA should build a consensus over its role as an agent of social change. All other roles should be viewed as subsidiary to this role.

v       HDFNA should establish an implementing organization in Pakistan, linked closely to HDFNA but with broad resident Pakistani involvement.

1.4 · The Social Agenda

The most significant issue facing the new institution is the vision of change that it will project.  The definition of socio-economic progress in Pakistan includes a considerable degree of diversity.  The earlier, and still the technocratic perception is one that is based on some notion of "deprivation", and therefore of attempts to overcome this deprivation. To summarize (and to slightly caricature) this approach, it could be said that the problem of development is that income levels, or productivity, or physical infrastructure (factories, roads, telephones, schools, hospitals), or social infrastructure (doctors, nurses, engineers, teachers) are below the required levels, and therefore ought to be increased.  The solution therefore is to invest in sectors that are viewed as deprived or deficient. Understandably, this approach has led to an almost exclusive preoccupation with physical capital or physical infrastructure.  More recently, human capital (skills, training, education) was added to physical capital, but in a manner that reproduced the infrastructure-based approach. Thus the production of skills was seen to take place primarily through physical infrastructure (schools, laboratories, and the like).

However, this has not been the only approach practiced in the country.  Simultaneously, practitioners from NGOs and civil society institutions have articulated another approach.  In contrast to the traditional approach that focused on physical or human capital, this approach concentrates on what the literature has begun to call "social capital".  Social capital can be described variously as the social capacity to make collective decisions, the existence and level of trust in society, and the nature of institutions and common knowledges that engender collective action.

An illustration of the difference between the two approaches is their treatment of what can be called the "poverty complex".  The poverty complex refers to the existence of a situation not only of inadequate income or nutrition, but also of a lack of access to basic services and resources, an inability to satisfy basic needs, vulnerability to external shocks, and fear of the future.

The mainstream approach characterizes this situation in terms of “deprivation” namely as the lack of certain services or infrastructure, and seeks to provide these services through some organizational mechanism.  The alternative approaches, however, describe the same situation in terms of the lack of capacity among the poor to overcome their situation.  They focus instead on the weakness of collective institutions, the nature of shocks (both natural and policy induced) that exacerbate the situation, the role by government and government policy in sustaining or easing the problems, and above all the coping strategies of the poor themselves.  In this approach, the solution lies not in the provision of services per se (although that is important), but in creating the capacity amongst the population to supply the services on a regular and sustainable basis.

It is fair to say that the deprivation-based model is well integrated into the political and governmental structure.  It caters to the self-image of the government as a benevolent despot.  It is compatible with the centralized political structure inherited from colonial rule.  It leads directly to the preferred bureaucratic option of building more and more infrastructure (although the infrastructure that is already built is not running very well).  And it corresponds well with the manner in which economic decisions are taken by the government.  However, in countries like Pakistan, such approaches have generally not led to demonstrable success.

The capacity based model on the other hand appears to underpin the bulk of the effort led by civil society institutions.  It can take many forms: community development and institution building (AKRSP, OPP), education and information (APPNA-Sehat, FPAP), public interest research and/or advocacy (SDPI, HDC, Aurat Foundation, ASR, Shirkatgah), rights based advocacy (WAF, HRCP), or a combination of these.  The aim of these interventions is to strengthen the capacity of individuals and communities to make collective decisions, to render government institutions and agencies more socially responsible, and to support the coping strategies of the poor and the vulnerable.  Since the focus is on individual as well as collective capacities, these approaches often involve considerable effort in institution building.  Many efforts focus on such things as social mobilization, participation and empowerment, improvement of management (especially at local levels), and public information and advocacy.  In many cases, the intervention is indirect, in the sense that it seeks to build capacity to undertake particular activities, rather than the supply of services directly.

It is also fair to say, however, that this approach is tangential or orthogonal to system of governance.  It has not thus far been taken up in a systematic way by any government or political party as its agenda.  Conversely, none of the advocates or practitioners of this approach have become active or successful in mainstream politics.

This does not mean, however, that it can simply be reduced to a government-versus-NGO conflict.  The difference lies not in whether government agencies can adopt this approach (some, e.g. Khuda ki Basti in Hyderabad, have done so with considerable success).  Nor does it lie in whether all NGOs endorse this approach (many do not).  The difference is rather in the differing sets of incentives and motivation in the two contrasting spheres of public service (i.e. government and NGOs).  Governmental incentive structures militate against such goals as empowerment or participation.  Similarly, although service provision is an issue for both approaches, the capacity building model uses it as an entry point rather than an outcome.  The result is that attempts by governments to replicate the experience of NGOs have not been very successful.

On he other hand, while many NGOs have been quite successful in their efforts by using the capacity approach, their impact and reach has remained limited.  One reason is that the different efforts have not led to a synthesis in which various partners could work together.  Another reason is that there has been little effort to articulate a national vision that can integrate and synthesize the various independent efforts.  However, by and large the actions based on the capacity approach have much greater social legitimacy in the country, and are generally more effective in attaining the targets.

HDFNA should not act in such a way as to intensify the perceived conflict between government and NGO-led approaches.  Rather, it should it should attempt to make its program useful and relevant to the government, without giving in to governmental operational or managerial systems.  It should identify and work closely with opinion-leaders within government (both political and bureaucratic) that are sympathetic to its goals and values.  Some examples of such NGO-government cooperation have been provided in the next section.

Our key recommendations regarding the Social Agenda are:

v       HDFNA should base its model of social intervention on capacity rather than deprivation.

v       It should also make an effort to introduce some degree of cooperation between the different partners. This can be done through the use of a collaborative approach to social intervention.

v       In particular, it should seek to involve government agencies in its work in order to reduce the distance between government and NGOs.

v       Monitoring should be an integral component of the work. Partners should be associated to perform this on a continuous basis.

1.5 · Vision of Collective Action

HDFNA has to decide whether it would see itself as an independent actor carrying out a particular program, or whether it would be a member of a group of partners who carry out the actions in a collaborative fashion. This issue is discussed in detail in the following chapters. A few broad observations can be made here.

v       First, the idea of collaborative action is central to the approach that focuses on capacity rather than deprivation.

v       Second, while many NGOs have attempted to engender collaborative action in the communities where they work, there has been little effort to encourage NGOs to collaborate with each other on a systematic basis.

v       Third, indeed, many NGOs consider collaboration to be a difficult if not impossible endeavor, given the egos involved in such action. In fact, as in the case of the community development effort, collaboration would not take place without proper investment and incentives to do so. Indeed, as the experience of community development demonstrates someone has to play the role of a catalyst and a support organization to ensure that collaboration takes place. Among other factors, this requires a long-term commitment by the catalytic organization to its goals.

v       Fourth, the major obstacle against the refinement of the capacity model might be the inability to pull the different programs together so that they support each other rather than every institutions doing everything itself.

This implies that there is a niche out there for an institution to take the lead.  This is similar to the initiative taken by the leaders of community development work, when they went out to encourage collaboration amongst people of villages.  The objective here is to apply the same lessons at a larger inter-institutional level. HDFNA is well placed to take advantage of this opportunity and to advance the social agenda.

However, this would require a long-term commitment by HDFNA not only to the program area but also to its partners.  This means preparing proper agreements that would give every partner the assurance that the collaboration will not be one sided. It also means setting up processes that can ensure that the cooperation takes place in practice.

An issue in this regard is whether HDFNA should cooperate with the government.  As mentioned, there are a number of obstacles against such cooperation. Many observers remark upon the inefficiency and corruption in the government machinery as obstacles to cooperation.  Many NGOs stay away from governments not only in order not to get tainted by the endemic corruption and irresponsibility, but also to avoid becoming associated too closely with particular political regimes. These are justifiable reasons. Nevertheless, the resultant undermining of the governmental machinery does not serve the cause of the poor who continue to receive the bulk of their services from the government.

Here, one can distinguish between two forms of cooperation.  First is cooperation with the political government, in other words influencing the policies and actions of the highest levels of the government, especially to induce it to rely upon HDFNA. This need not involve partisanship or even a suspicion of partnership, since many political governments seem happy to transfer their functions to credible organizations and reap the credit themselves.  However, this does call for the exercise of proper judgment and prudence to maintain a proper distance from the government.

A second form of cooperation is with governmental agencies. This does not normally pose a political problem, but it can be difficult in practice, especially if government functionaries in the project area are incompetent or corrupt. Most organizations take these decisions on contextual grounds. If they are lucky to get good people, they cooperate enthusiastically; otherwise they try to make the best of a bad situation. However, the links with the higher echelons of government can help in overcoming this obstacle as well.  For example, the environmental organization, IUCN, works closely with the government of NWFP, maintains good relations with higher officials as well as environmental manages. Because of its high profile activity, the government tends to appoint competent and clean officers in critical positions. This is accomplished without the existence or appearance of collusion or partisanship. This model can be recommended to HDFNA.

1.6 · Fundraising and Leveraging

HDFNA's primary source of funds is the non-resident Pakistani community in North America.  Thus far, it has relied mainly on large contributions from a few founding members.  However, while the amounts collected are large when looked at from an individual point of view, they are very small in relation to the size of the problem, the size of other (mainly bilateral) technical assistance funds, and also the potential size of the funds that could be generated.

There is a high degree of enthusiasm amongst Pakistanis living in North America to contribute to an improvement in Pakistan's living conditions. However, this enthusiasm cannot be translated into action unless proper channels for contribution can be created.  There is little willingness to contribute to the government directly because the government is viewed both as incompetent and corrupt.  HDFNA can fill the gap by providing a credible and effective channel for such investment.  However, in order to do so, it will have to take a slightly different strategy. 

v       First, this would be impossible without a concerted program of communication, based on systematic collection of information.  It cannot rely only on oral presentation before selected audiences.  It must ensure that its message reaches a larger audience.  This can be done by preparing information materials, printed as well as electronic (e.g., video documentaries), Internet sites, regular outreach programs, etc.  The key responsibility for this activity will have to reside with the head of the North American office of HDFNA.  The person to fill this post should be selected on the basis of his or her capacity for fundraising, communication, and networking. 

v       Second, the program must be able to cater to large as well as small donors.  This will include people whose individual contributions may be small—say twenty dollars a month—but whose collective contribution would be significant both in monetary terms and in terms of free publicity.  The program must be open, transparent, and responsive to small donors and provide them with a real sense of participation in "something big" (e.g., through a newsletter).  It must also be responsive to large donors who are interested in investment in selected thematic or geographical areas.  This can be done by instituting special task forces to plan specific activities in areas where there is a particular interest. 

v       Finally, fundraising capacity will be enhanced by the demonstration that these funds can be leveraged into larger investment by raising funds (as well as mobilizing human resources) from other sources.  In Pakistan, the Poverty Fund of the World Bank, the multi-donor Social Action Program, the Trust for Voluntary Organizations (TVO), and a number of bilateral donors (especially the Swiss, Dutch, Norwegians, Canadians, and the Asia Foundation) are good candidates for partnership.  This would obviously be on a case by case basis and would require the preparation of background project documents (one of which may be this study).

1.7 · Communication

Neither fundraising nor legitimacy is possible without a proper communication strategy.  All successful programs in Pakistan (and, for that matter, elsewhere) have been accompanied by a successful and comprehensive communication component that went beyond simply producing a brochure or two to actively engaging their key audiences in an ongoing basis. 

A successful communication strategy requires investment in data collection and analysis and converting it into a form that is accessible to the broader public (including contributors and beneficiaries).  A regular program of monitoring and evaluation should, in fact, be seen as a component of the larger communication strategy.  An integrated program of collecting relevant data, analyzing it for its salient implications, and inviting broader audiences to share these findings—and, in fact, to undertake analysis of their own—instills a tremendous amount of transparency and legitimacy to the initiative.

The temptation to reduce monitoring to simply an accounting exercise has to be resisted.  The focus of the monitoring and evaluation program has to be outcome-based, forward-looking and transparent.  First, determining the outcomes of the intervention is much more important than simply accounting for how the inputs were used.  Second, a key purpose of assessing whether things were done right in the past is to ensure that they are done better in the future.  Third, not only should the project's own assessments be accessible and shared, but others (especially scholars and academic) should be encouraged to undertake assessments of their own. 

In designing its communication component, HDFNA should keep in mind some of the lessons from existing experiences.  Two, in particular, should be highlighted.

First, some of the NGOs engaged in community development have made a considerable effort in assessing the effectiveness of their effort, through periodic reviews. APPNA-Sehat has carried this forward by building up a strong information base on social conditions. This is particularly useful, because unlike governmental efforts, it focuses on the impact of the activities (i.e. infant mortality, morbidity) rather than the inputs (i.e. schools, hospitals, medicines distributed).

This idea should be incorporated centrally into the effort so that monitoring could take place on a continuous basis. This is also respectful towards the supposed beneficiaries, because it generates public data that they can use, rather than national aggregate data that only the government can use. In order to create a credible system of periodic review and assessment, it might be useful to associate an organization that would construct a human development index of the project area, and track its evolution over time. It would also be useful to have another organization to use the data to undertake systematic and continuous research on the issues facing the community.

Second, investment in communication can yield very impressive returns.  For example, under the leadership of its then Executive Director, James Grant, UNICEF was able to transform itself from just another small UN agency into probably the single most well respected arm of the world body.  Recent surveys show that of all the UN organs, UNICEF is the one most trusted, considered most effective, and deemed least inefficient.  Its powerful outreach program, selected use of world celebrities, and tapping the very small donors (e.g., through its campaign of collecting small change from world travelers, its merchandising program, etc.) have contributed much to its new image, and equally significantly to its resource base.

Although the kind of media campaign undertaken by UNICEF is obviously beyond the financial capacity of HDFNA, there are other similar examples that make that make the general lesson pertinent.  AKRSP, for example, has a very effective and successful program of communication and dissemination which includes its video documentaries, outreach programs, vigorous participation in scholarly and practitioner meetings, conferences, etc., and an open door policy for experts and scholars wishing to study its efforts.  All of this has contributed to AKRSP having a higher international and national profile and goodwill than most other similar initiatives.

Date/Time Last Modified: 6/17/2002 4:30:03 PM

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