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The
Philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience (continued)
If we look at the movement
embodied in creation from the outside, that is to say, if we apprehend it intellectually,
it is a process lasting through thousands of years; for one Divine day, in the
terminology of the Qur’«n, as of the Old Testament, is equal to one thousand
years.26 From another point of view, the process of creation, lasting
through thousands of years, is a single indivisible act, ‘swift as the
twinkling of an eye’. It is, however, impossible to express this inner
experience of pure duration in words, for language is shaped on the serial time
of our daily efficient self. Perhaps an illustration will further elucidate
the point. According to physical science, the cause of your sensation of red
is the rapidity of wave motion the frequency of which is 400 billions per second.
If you could observe this tremendous frequency from the outside, and count it
at the rate of 2,000 per second, which is supposed to be the limit of the perceptibility
of light, it will take you more than six thousand years to finish the enumeration.27
Yet in the single momentary mental act of perception you hold together a frequency
of wave motion which is practically incalculable. That is how the mental act
transforms succession into duration. The appreciative self, then, is more or
less corrective of the efficient self, inasmuch as it synthesizes all the ‘heres’
and ‘nows’ - the small changes of space and time, indispensable to
the efficient self - into the coherent wholeness of personality. Pure time,
then, as revealed by a deeper analysis of our conscious experience, is not a
string of separate, reversible instants; it is an organic whole in which the
past is not left behind, but is moving along with, and operating in, the present.
And the future is given to it not as lying before, yet to be traversed; it is
given only in the sense that it is present in its nature as an open possibility.28
It is time regarded as an organic whole that the Qur’«n describes as Taqdâr
or the destiny - a word which has been so much misunderstood both in and outside
the world of Islam. Destiny is time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its
possibilities. It is time freed from the net of causal sequence - the diagrammatic
character which the logical understanding imposes on it. In one word, it is
time as felt and not as thought and calculated. If you ask me why the Emperor
Huma«yën and Sh«h Tahm«sp of Persia were contemporaries, I can give you no causal
explanation. The only answer that can possibly be given is that the nature of
Reality is such that among its infinite possibilities of becoming, the two possibilities
known as the lives of Hum«yën and Sh«h Tahm«sp should realize themselves together.
Time regarded as destiny forms the very essence of things. As the Qur’«n
says: ‘God created all things and assigned to each its destiny.’29
The destiny of a thing then is not an unrelenting fate working from without
like a task master; it is the inward reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities
which lie within the depths of its nature, and serially actualize themselves
without any feeling of external compulsion. Thus the organic wholeness of duration
does not mean that full-fledged events are lying, as it were, in the womb of
Reality, and drop one by one like the grains of sand from the hour-glass. If
time is real, and not a mere repetition of homogeneous moments which make conscious
experience a delusion, then every moment in the life of Reality is original,
giving birth to what is absolutely novel and unforeseeable. ‘Everyday doth
some new work employ Him’,30 says the Qur’«n. To exist
in real time is not to be bound by the fetters of serial time, but to create
it from moment to moment and to be absolutely free and original in creation.
In fact, all creative activity is free activity. Creation is opposed to repetition
which is a characteristic of mechanical action. That is why it is impossible
to explain the creative activity of life in terms of mechanism. Science seeks
to establish uniformities of experience, i.e. the laws of mechanical repetition.
Life with its intense feeling of spontaneity constitutes a centre of indetermination,
and thus falls outside the domain of necessity. Hence science cannot comprehend
life. The biologist who seeks a mechanical explanation of life is led to do
so because he confines his study to the lower forms of life whose behaviour
discloses resemblances to mechanical action. If he studies life as manifested
in himself, i.e. his own mind freely choosing, rejecting, reflecting, surveying
the past and the present, and dynamically imagining the future, he is sure to
be convinced of the inadequacy of his mechanical concepts.
On the analogy of our conscious
experience, then, the universe is a free creative movement. But how can we conceive
a movement independent of a concrete thing that moves? The answer is that the
notion of ‘things’ is derivative. We can derive ‘things’
from movement; we cannot derive movement from immobile things. If, for instance,
we suppose material atoms, such as the atoms of Democritus, to be the original
Reality, we must import movement into them from the outside as something alien
to their nature. Whereas if we take movement as original, static things may
be derived from it. In fact, physical science has reduced all things to movement.
The essential nature of the atom in modern science is electricity and not something
electrified. Apart from this, things are not given in immediate experience as
things already possessing definite contours, for immediate experience is a continuity
without any distinctions in it. What we call things are events in the continuity
of Nature which thought spatializes and thus regards as mutually isolated for
purposes of action. The universe which seems to us to be a collection of things
is not a solid stuff occupying a void. It is not a thing but an act. The nature
of thought according to Bergson is serial; it cannot deal with movement, except
by viewing it as a series of stationary points. It is, therefore, the operation
of thought, working with static concepts, that gives the appearance of a series
of immobilities to what is essentially dynamic in its nature. The co-existence
and succession of these immobilities is the source of what we call space and
time.
According to Bergson, then,
Reality is a free unpredictable, creative, vital impetus of the nature of volition
which thought spatializes and views as a plurality of ‘things’. A
full criticism of this view cannot be undertaken here. Suffice it to say that
the vitalism of Bergson ends in an insurmountable dualism of will and thought.
This is really due to the partial view of intelligence that he takes. Intelligence,
according to him, is a spatializing activity; it is shaped on matter alone,
and has only mechanical categories at its disposal. But, as I pointed out in
my first lecture, thought has a deeper movement also.31 While it
appears to break up Reality into static fragments, its real function is to synthesize
the elements of experience by employing categories suitable to the various levels
which experience presents. It is as much organic as life. The movement of life,
as an organic growth, involves a progressive synthesis of its various stages.
Without this synthesis it will cease to be organic growth. It is determined
by ends, and the presence of ends means that it is permeated by intelligence.
Nor is the activity of intelligence possible without the presence of ends. In
conscious experience life and thought permeate each other. They form a unity.
Thought, therefore, in its true nature, is identical with life. Again, in Bergson’s
view the forward rush of the vital impulse in its creative freedom is unilluminated
by the light of an immediate or a remote purpose. It is not aiming at a result;
it is wholly arbitrary, undirected, chaotic, and unforeseeable in its behaviour.
It is mainly here that Bergson’s analysis of our conscious experience reveals
its inadequacy. He regards conscious experience as the past moving along with
and operating in the present. He ignores that the unity of consciousness has
a forward looking aspect also. Life is only a series of acts of attention, and
an act of attention is inexplicable without reference to a purpose, conscious
or unconscious. Even our acts of perception are determined by our immediate
interests and purposes. The Persian poet ‘urfâ’ has given a beautiful
expression to this aspect of human perception. He says:32
‘If
your heart is not deceived by the mirage, be not proud of the sharpness of your
understanding;
for your freedom from this optical illusion is due to your imperfect thirst.’
The poet means to say that
if you had a vehement desire for drink, the sands of the desert would have given
you the impression of a lake. Your freedom from the illusion is due to the absence
of a keen desire for water. You have perceived the thing as it is because you
were not interested in perceiving it as it is not. Thus ends and purposes, whether
they exist as conscious or subconscious tendencies, form the warp and woof of
our conscious experience. And the notion of purpose cannot be understood except
in reference to the future. The past, no doubt, abides and operates in the present;
but this operation of the past in the present is not the whole of consciousness.
The element of purpose discloses a kind of forward look in consciousness. Purposes
not only colour our present states of consciousness, but also reveal its future
direction. In fact, they constitute the forward push of our life, and thus in
a way anticipate and influence the states that are yet to be. To be determined
by an end is to be determined by what ought to be. Thus past and future both
operate in the present state of consciousness, and the future is not wholly
undetermined as Bergson’s analysis of our conscious experience shows. A
state of attentive consciousness involves both memory and imagination as operating
factors. On the analogy of our conscious experience, therefore, Reality is not
a blind vital impulse wholly unilluminated by idea. Its nature is through and
through teleological.
Bergson, however, denies
the teleological character of Reality on the ground that teleology makes time
unreal. According to him ‘the portals of the future must remain wide open
to Reality’. Otherwise, it will not be free and creative. No doubt, if
teleology means the working out of a plan in view of a predetermined end or
goal, it does make time unreal. It reduces the universe to a mere temporal reproduction
of a pre-existing eternal scheme or structure in which individual events have
already found their proper places, waiting, as it were, for their respective
turns to enter into the temporal sweep of history. All is already given somewhere
in eternity; the temporal order of events is nothing more than a mere imitation
of the eternal mould. Such a view is hardly distinguishable from mechanism which
we have already rejected.33 In fact, it is a kind of veiled materialism
in which fate or destiny takes the place of rigid determinism, leaving no scope
for human or even Divine freedom. The world regarded as a process realizing
a preordained goal is not a world of free, responsible moral agents; it is only
a stage on which puppets are made to move by a kind of pull from behind. There
is, however, another sense of teleology. From our conscious experience we have
seen that to live is to shape and change ends and purposes and to be governed
by them. Mental life is teleological in the sense that, while there is no far-off
distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of
fresh ends, purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows
and expands. We become by ceasing to be what we are. Life is a passage through
a series of deaths. But there is a system in the continuity of this passage.
Its various stages, in spite of the apparently abrupt changes in our evaluation
of things, are organically related to one another. The life-history of the individual
is, on the whole, a unity and not a mere series of mutually ill-adapted events.
The world-process, or the movement of the universe in time, is certainly devoid
of purpose, if by purpose we mean a foreseen end - a far-off fixed destination
to which the whole creation moves. To endow the world-process with purpose in
this sense is to rob it of its originality and its creative character. Its ends
are terminations of a career; they are ends to come and not necessarily premeditated.
A time-process cannot be conceived as a line already drawn. It is a line in
the drawing - an actualization of open possibilities. It is purposive only in
this sense that it is selective in character, and brings itself to some sort
of a present fulfilment by actively preserving and supplementing the past. To
my mind nothing is more alien to the Quranic outlook than the idea that the
universe is the temporal working out of a preconceived plan. As I have already
pointed out, the universe, according to the Qur’«n, is liable to increase.34
It is a growing universe and not an already completed product which left the
hand of its maker ages ago, and is now lying stretched in space as a dead mass
of matter to which time does nothing, and consequently is nothing.
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[See
Notes]
Date/Time Last Modified: 6/18/2002 8:03:07 AM
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