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The
Human Ego – His Freedom and Immortality
THE Qur’«n
in its simple, forceful manner emphasizes the individuality and uniqueness of
man, and has, I think, a definite view of his destiny as a unity of life.1
It is in consequence of this view of man as a unique individuality which makes
it impossible for one individual to bear the burden of another,2
and entitles him only to what is due to his own personal effort,3
that the Qur’«n is led to reject the idea of redemption. Three things are
perfectly clear from the Qur’«n:
(i) That
man is the chosen of God:
‘Afterwards
his Lord chose him [Adam] for himself and turned towards, him, and guided him,
(20:122).
(ii) That
man, with all his faults, is meant to be the representative of God on earth:
‘When
thy Lord said to the angels, "Verily I am about to place one in my stead
on Earth", they said, ‘Wilt Thou place there one who will do ill therein
and shed blood, when we celebrate Thy praise and extol Thy holiness?’ God
said, "Verily I know what you know not", (2:30).
‘And
it is He Who hath made you His representatives on the Earth, and hath raised
some of you above others by various grades, that He may prove you by His gifts’
(6:165).
(iii) That
man is the trustee of a free personality which he accepted at his peril:
‘Verily
We proposed to the Heavens, and to the Earth, and to the mountains to receive
the "trust", but they refused the burden and they feared to receive
it. Man undertook to bear it, but hath proved unjust, senseless!’ (33:72).
Yet it is
surprising to see that the unity of human consciousness which constitutes the
centre of human personality never really became a point of interest in the history
of Muslim thought. The Mutakallimën regarded the soul as a finer kind
of matter or a mere accident which dies with the body and is re-created on the
Day of Judgement. The philosophers of Islam received inspiration from Greek
thought. In the case of other schools, it must be remembered that the expansion
of Islam brought within its fold peoples belonging to different creed-communities,
such as Nestorians, Jews, Zoroastrians, whose intellectual outlook had been
formed by the concepts of a culture which had long dominated the whole of middle
and western Asia. This culture, on the whole Magian in its origin and development,
has a structurally dualistic soul-picture which we find more or less reflected
in the theological thought of Islam.4 Devotional Sufism alone tried
to understand the meaning of the unity of inner experience which the Qur’«n
declares to be one of the three sources of knowledge,5 the other
two being History and Nature. The development of this experience in the religious
life of Islam reached its culmination in the well-known words of Hall«j - ‘I
am the creative truth.’ The contemporaries of Hall«j, as well as his successors,
interpreted these words pantheistically; but the fragments of Hall«j, collected
and published by the French Orientalist, L. Massignon, leave no doubt that the
martyr-saint could not have meant to deny the transcendence of God.6
The true interpretation of his experience, therefore, is not the drop slipping
into the sea, but the realization and bold affirmation in an undying phrase
of the reality and permanence of the human ego in a profounder personality.
The phrase of Hall«j seems almost a challenge flung against the Mutakallimën.
The difficulty of modern students of religion, however, is that this type of
experience, though perhaps perfectly normal in its beginnings, points, in its
maturity, to unknown levels of consciousness. Ibn Khaldën, long ago, felt the
necessity of an effective scientific method to investigate these levels.7
Modern psychology has only recently realized the necessity of such a method,
but has not yet been able to go beyond the discovery of the characteristic features
of the mystic levels of consciousness.8 Not being yet in possession
of a scientific method to deal with the type of experience on which such judgements
as that of Hall«j are based, we cannot avail ourselves of its possible capacity
as a knowledge-yielding experience. Nor can the concepts of theological systems,
draped in the terminology of a practically dead metaphysics, be of any help
to those who happen to possess a different intellectual background. The task
before the modern Muslim is, therefore, immense. He has to rethink the whole
system of Islam without completely breaking with the past. Perhaps the first
Muslim who felt the urge of a new spirit in him was Sh«h WalâAll«h of Delhi.
The man, however, who fully realized the importance and immensity of the task,
and whose deep insight into the inner meaning of the history of Muslim thought
and life, combined with a broad vision engendered by his wide experience of
men and manners, would have made him a living link between the past and the
future, was Jam«luddân Afgh«nâ. If his indefatigable but divided energy could
have devoted itself entirely to Islam as a system of human belief and conduct,
the world of Islam, intellectually speaking, would have been on a much more
solid ground today. The only course open to us is to approach modern knowledge
with a respectful but independent attitude and to appreciate the teachings of
Islam in the light of that knowledge, even though we may be led to differ from
those who have gone before us. This I propose to do in regard to the subject
of the present lecture.
In the history
of modern thought it is Bradley who furnishes the best evidence for the impossibility
of denying reality to the ego. In his Ethical Studies9 he
assumes the reality of the self; in his Logic10 he takes it only
as a working hypothesis. It is in his Appearance and Reality that he
subjects the ego to a searching examination.11 Indeed, his two chapters
on the meaning and reality of the self may be regarded as a kind of modern Upanishad
on the unreality of the Jâv«tm«.12 According to him, the test
of reality is freedom from contradiction and since his criticism discovers the
finite centre of experience to be infected with irreconcilable oppositions of
change and permanence, unity and diversity, the ego is a mere illusion. Whatever
may be our view of the self - feeling, self-identity, soul, will - it can be
examined only by the canons of thought which in its nature is relational, and
all ‘relations involve contradictions’. Yet, in spite of the fact
that his ruthless logic has shown the ego to be a mass of confusion, Bradley
has to admit that the self must be ‘in some sense real’, ‘in
some sense an indubitable fact’.13 We may easily grant that
the ego, in its finitude, is imperfect as a unity of life. Indeed, its nature
is wholly aspiration after a unity more inclusive, more effective, more balanced,
and unique. Who knows how many different kinds of environment it needs for its
organization as a perfect unity? At the present stage of its organization it
is unable to maintain the continuity of its tension without constant relaxation
of sleep. An insignificant stimulus may sometimes disrupt its unity and nullify
it as a controlling energy. Yet, however thought may dissect and analyse, our
feeling of egohood is ultimate and is powerful enough to extract from Professor
Bradley the reluctant admission of its reality.
The finite
centre of experience, therefore, is real, even though its reality is too profound
to be intellectualized. What then is the characteristic feature of the ego?
The ego reveals itself as a unity of what we call mental states. Mental states
do not exist in mutual isolation. They mean and involve one another. They exist
as phases of a complex whole, called mind. The organic unity, however, of these
interrelated states or, let us say, events is a special kind of unity. It fundamentally
differs from the unity of a material thing; for the parts of a material thing
can exist in mutual isolation. Mental unity is absolutely unique. We cannot
say that one of my beliefs is situated on the right or left of my other belief.
Nor is it possible to say that my appreciation of the beauty of the T«j varies
with my distance from ÿgra. My thought of space is not spatially related to
space. Indeed, the ego can think of more than one space-order. The space of
waking consciousness and dream-space have no mutual relation. They do not interfere
with or overlap each other. For the body there can be but a single space. The
ego, therefore, is not space-bound in the sense in which the body is space-bound.
Again, mental and physical events are both in time, but the time-span of the
ego is fundamentally different to the time-span of the physical event. The duration
of the physical event is stretched out in space as a present fact; the ego’s
duration is concentrated within it and linked with its present and future in
a unique manner. The formation of a physical event discloses certain present
marks which show that it has passed through a time-duration; but these marks
are merely emblematic of its time duration; not time-duration itself. True time–duration
belongs to the ego alone.
Another
important characteristic of the unity of the ego is its essential privacy which
reveals the uniqueness of every ego. In order to reach a certain conclusion
all the premisses of a syllogism must be believed in by one and the same mind.
If I believe in the proposition ‘all men are mortal’, and another
mind believes in the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’, no inference
is possible. It is possible only if both the propositions are believed in by
me. Again, my desire for a certain thing is essentially mine. Its satisfaction
means my private enjoyment. If all mankind happen to desire the same thing,
the satisfaction of their desire will not mean the satisfaction of my desire
when I do not get the thing desired. The dentist may sympathize with my toothache,
but cannot experience the feeling of my toothache. My pleasures, pains, and
desires are exclusively mine, forming a part and parcel of my private ego alone.
My feelings, hates and loves, judgements and resolutions, are exclusively mine.
God Himself cannot feel, judge, and choose for me when more than one course
of action are open to me. Similarly, in order to recognize you, I must have
known you in the past. My recognition of a place or person means reference to
my past experience, and not the past experience of another ego. It is this unique
interrelation of our mental states14 that we express by the word
‘I’, and it is here that the great problem of psychology begins to
appear. What is the nature of this ‘I’?
Page [1, 2,
3, 4, 5]
[See
Notes]
Date/Time Last Modified: 6/18/2002 8:03:23 AM
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