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The
Spirit of Muslim Culture (continued)
From this summary of ‘Ir«qā’s
view you will see how a cultured Muslim Sufi`intellectually interpreted his
spiritual experience of time and space in an age which had no idea of the theories
and concepts of modern Mathematics and Physics. ‘Ir«qā is really trying
to reach the concept of space as a dynamic appearance. His mind seems to be
vaguely struggling with the concept of space as an infinite continuum; yet he
was unable to see the full implications of his thought partly because he was
not a mathematician and partly because of his natural prejudice in favour of
the traditional Aristotelian idea of a fixed universe. Again, the interpenetration
of the super-spatial ‘here’ and super-eternal ‘now’ in the
Ultimate Reality suggests the modern notion of space-time which Professor Alexander,
in his lectures on ‘Space, Time, and Deity’, regards as the matrix
of all things.36 A keener insight into the nature of time would have
led ‘Ir«qā to see that time is more fundamental of the two; and that it
is not a mere metaphor to say, as Professor Alexander does say, that time is
the mind of space.37 ‘Ir«qā conceives God’s relation to
the universe on the analogy of the relation of the human soul to the body;38
but, instead of philosophically reaching this position through a criticism of
the spatial and temporal aspects of experience, he simply postulates it on the
basis of his spiritual experience. It is not sufficient merely to reduce space
and time to a vanishing point-instant. The philosophical path that leads to
God as the omnipsyche of the universe lies through the discovery of living thought
as the ultimate principle of space-time. ‘Ir«qā’s mind, no doubt,
moved in the right direction, but his Aristotelian prejudices, coupled with
a lack of psychological analysis, blocked his progress. With his view that Divine
Time is utterly devoid of change39 - a view obviously based on an
inadequate analysis of conscious experience - it was not possible for him to
discover the relation between Divine Time and serial time, and to reach, through
this discovery, the essentially Islamic idea of continuous creation which means
a growing universe.
Thus all lines of Muslim
thought converge on a dynamic conception of the universe. This view is further
reinforced by Ibn Maskawaih’s theory of life as an evolutionary movement,
and Ibn Khaldėn’s view of history. History or, in the language of the Qur’«n,
‘the days of God’, is the third source of human knowledge according
to the Qur’«n. It is one of the most essential teachings of the Qur’«n
that nations are collectively judged, and suffer for their misdeeds here and
now.40 In order to establish this proposition, the Qur’«n constantly
cites historical instances, and urges upon the reader to reflect on the past
and present experience of mankind.
"Of old did We send
Moses with Our signs, and said to him: ‘Bring forth thy people from the
darkness into the light, and remind them of the days of God." Verily, in
this are signs for every patient, grateful person’ (14:5).
‘And among those whom
We had created are a people who guide others with truth, and in accordance therewith
act justly. But as for those who treat Our signs as lies, We gradually ring
them down by means of which they know not; and though I lengthen their days,
verily, My stratagem is effectual’ (7:181-83).
‘Already, before your
time, have precedents been made. Traverse the Earth then, and see what hath
been the end of those who falsify the signs of God!’ (3:137).
‘If a wound hath befallen
you, a wound like it hath already befallen others; We alternate the days of
successes and reverses among peoples’ (3:140).
‘Every nation hath
its fixed period’ (7:34).41
The last verse is rather
an instance of a more specific historical generalization which, in its epigrammatic
formulation, suggests the possibility of a scientific treatment of the life
of human societies regarded as organisms. It is, therefore, a gross error to
think that the Qur’«n has no germs of a historical doctrine. The truth
is that the whole spirit of the ‘Prolegomena’ of Ibn Khaldėn appears
to have been mainly due to the inspiration which the author must have received
from the Qur’«n. Even in his judgements of character he is, in no small
degree, indebted to the Qur’«n. An instance in point is his long paragraph
devoted to an estimate of the character of the Arabs as a people. The whole
paragraph is a mere amplification of the following verses of the Qur’«n:
‘The Arabs of the
desert are most stout in unbelief and dissimulation; and likelier it is that
they should be unaware of the laws which God hath sent down to His Apostle;
and God is Knowing, Wise.
‘Of the Arabs of the
desert there are some who reckon what they expend in the cause of God as tribute,
and wait for some change of fortune to befall you: a change for evil shall befall
them! God is the Hearer, the Knower’ (9:97-98).
However, the interest of
the Qur’«n in history, regarded as a source of human knowledge, extends
farther than mere indications of historical generalizations. It has given us
one of the most fundamental principles of historical criticism: Since accuracy
in recording facts which constitute the material of history is an indispensable
condition of history as a science, and an accurate knowledge of facts ultimately
depends on those who report them, the very first principle of historical criticism
is that the reporter’s personal character is an important factor in judging
his testimony. The Qur’«n says:
‘O believers! if any
bad man comes to you with a report, clear it up at once’ (49:6).
It is the application of
the principle embodied in this verse to the reporters of the Prophet’s
traditions out of which were gradually evolved the canons of historical criticism.
The growth of historical sense in Islam is a fascinating subject.42
The Quranic appeal to experience, the necessity to ascertain the exact sayings
of the Prophet, and the desire to furnish permanent sources of inspiration to
posterity - all these forces contributed to produce such men as Ibn Ish«q,43
ńabarā,44 and Mas‘ėdā.45 But history, as an art of
firing the reader’s imagination, is only a stage in the development of
history as a genuine science. The possibility of a scientific treatment of history
means a wider experience, a greater maturity of practical reason, and finally
a fuller realization of certain basic ideas regarding the nature of life and
time. These ideas are in the main two; and both form the foundation of the Quranic
teaching.
1. The Unity of Human Origin.
‘And We have created you all from one breath of life’, says the Qur’«n.46
But the perception of life as an organic unity is a slow achievement, and depends
for its growth on a people’s entry into the main current of world-events.
This opportunity was brought to Islam by the rapid development of a vast empire.
No doubt, Christianity, long before Islam, brought the message of equality to
mankind; but Christian Rome did not rise to the full apprehension of the idea
of humanity as a single organism. As Flint rightly says, ‘No Christian
writer and still less, of course, any other in the Roman Empire, can be credited
with having had more than a general and abstract conception of human unity.’
And since the days of Rome the idea does not seem to have gained much in depth
and rootage in Europe. On the other hand, the growth of territorial nationalism,
with its emphasis on what is called national characteristics, has tended rather
to kill the broad human element in the art and literature of Europe. It was
quite otherwise with Islam. Here the idea was neither a concept of philosophy
nor a dream of poetry. As a social movement the aim of Islam was to make the
idea a living factor in the Muslim’s daily life, and thus silently and
imperceptibly to carry it towards fuller fruition.
2. A Keen Sense
of the Reality of Time, and the Concept of Life as a Continuous Movement in
Time. It is this conception of life and time which is the main point of
interest in Ibn Khaldėn’s view of history, and which justifies Flint’s
eulogy that ‘Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine were not his peers, and all
others were unworthy of being even mentioned along with him’.47
From the remarks that I have made above I do not mean to throw doubt on the
originality of Ibn Khaldėn. All that I mean to say is that, considering the
direction in which the culture of Islam had unfolded itself, only a Muslim could
have viewed history as a continuous, collective movement, a real inevitable
development in time. The point of interest in this view of history is the way
in which Ibn Khaldėn conceives the process of change. His conception is of infinite
importance because of the implication that history, as a continuous movement
in time, is a genuinely creative movement and not a movement whose path is already
determined. Ibn Khaldėn was not a metaphysician. Indeed he was hostile to Metaphysics.48
But in view of the nature of his conception of time he may fairly be regarded
as a forerunner of Bergson. I have already discussed the intellectual antecedents
of this conception in the cultural history of Islam. The Quranic view of the
‘alternation of day and night’49 as a symbol of the Ultimate
Reality which ‘appears in a fresh glory every moment’,50
the tendency in Muslim Metaphysics to regard time as objective, Ibn Maskawaih’s
view of life as an evolutionary movement,51 and lastly al-Bārėnā’s
definite approach to the conception of Nature as a process of becoming52
- all this constituted the intellectual inheritance of Ibn Khaldėn. His chief
merit lies in his acute perception of, and systematic expression to, the spirit
of the cultural movement of which he was a most brilliant product. In the work
of this genius the anti-classical spirit of the Qur’«n scores its final
victory over Greek thought; for with the Greeks time was either unreal, as in
Plato and Zeno, or moved in a circle, as in Heraclitus and the Stoics.53
Whatever may be the criterion by which to judge the forward steps of a creative
movement, the movement itself, if conceived as cyclic, ceases to be creative.
Eternal recurrence is not eternal creation; it is eternal repetition.
We are now in a position
to see the true significance of the intellectual revolt of Islam against Greek
philosophy. The fact that this revolt originated in a purely theological interest
shows that the anti-classical spirit of the Qur’«n asserted itself in spite
of those who began with a desire to interpret Islam in the light of Greek thought.
It now remains to eradicate
a grave misunderstanding created by Spengler’s widely read book, The
Decline of the West. His two chapters devoted to the problem of Arabian
culture54 constitute a most important contribution to the cultural
history of Asia. They are, however, based on a complete misconception of the
nature of Islam as a religious movement, and of the cultural activity which
it initiated. Spengler’s main thesis is that each culture is a specific
organism, having no point of contact with cultures that historically precede
or follow it. Indeed, according to him, each culture has its own peculiar way
of looking at things which is entirely inaccessible to men belonging to a different
culture. In his anxiety to prove this thesis he marshals an overwhelming array
of facts and interpretations to show that the spirit of European culture is
through and through anti-classical. And this anti-classical spirit of European
culture is entirely due to the specific genius of Europe, and not to any inspiration
she may have received from the culture of Islam which, according to Spengler,
is thoroughly ‘Magian’ in spirit and character. Spengler’s view
of the spirit of modern culture is, in my opinion, perfectly correct. I have,
however, tried to show in these lectures that the anti-classical spirit of the
modern world has really arisen out of the revolt of Islam against Greek thought.55
It is obvious that such a view cannot be acceptable to Spengler; for, if it
is possible to show that the anti-classical spirit of modern culture is due
to the inspiration which it received from the culture immediately preceding
it, the whole argument of Spengler regarding the complete mutual independence
of cultural growths would collapse. I am afraid Spengler’s anxiety to establish
this thesis has completely perverted his vision of Islam as a cultural movement.
By the expression ‘Magian
culture’ Spengler means the common culture associated with what he calls
‘Magian group of religions’,56 i.e. Judaism, ancient Chaldean
religion, early Christianity, Zoroastrianism, and Islam. That a Magian crust
has grown over Islam, I do not deny. Indeed my main purpose in these lectures
has been to secure a vision of the spirit of Islam as emancipated from its Magian
overlayings which, in my opinion, have misled Spengler. His ignorance of Muslim
thought on the problem of time, as well as of the way in which the ‘I’,
as a free centre of experience, has found expression in the religious experience
of Islam, is simply appalling.57 Instead of seeking light from the
history of Muslim thought and experience, he prefers to base his judgement on
vulgar beliefs as to the beginning and end of time. Just imagine a man of overwhelming
learning finding support for the supposed fatalism of Islam in such Eastern
expressions and proverbs as the ‘vault of time’,58 and
‘everything has a time!’59 However, on the origin and growth
of the concept of time in Islam, and on the human ego as a free power, I have
said enough in these lectures. It is obvious that a full examination of Spengler’s
view of Islam, and of the culture that grew out of it, will require a whole
volume. In addition to what I have said before, I shall offer here one more
observation of a general nature.
‘The kernel of the
prophetic teaching,’ says Spengler, ‘is already Magian. There is one
God - be He called Yahweh,60 Ahuramazda, or Marduk-Baal
- who is the principle of good, and all other deities are either impotent or
evil. To this doctrine there attached itself the hope of a Messiah, very clear
in Isaiah, but also bursting out everywhere during the next centuries, under
pressure of an inner necessity. It is the basic idea of Magian religion, for
it contains implicitly the conception of the world-historical struggle between
Good and Evil, with the power of Evil prevailing in the middle period, and the
Good finally triumphant on the Day of Judgement.’60 If this view of the
prophetic teaching is meant to apply to Islam it is obviously a misrepresentation.
The point to note is that the Magian admitted the existence of false gods; only
they did not turn to worship them. Islam denies the very existence of false
gods. In this connexion Spengler fails to appreciate the cultural value of the
idea of the finality of prophethood in Islam. No doubt, one important feature
of Magian culture is a perpetual attitude of expectation, a constant looking
forward to the coming of Zoroaster’s unborn sons, the Messiah, or the Paraclete
of the fourth gospel. I have already indicated the direction in which the student
of Islam should seek the cultural meaning of the doctrine of finality in Islam.
It may further be regarded as a psychological cure for the Magian attitude of
constant expectation which tends to give a false view of history. Ibn Khaldėn,
seeing the spirit of his own view of history, has fully criticized and, I believe,
finally demolished the alleged revelational basis in Islam of an idea similar,
at least in its psychological effects, to the original Magian idea which had
reappeared in Islam under the pressure of Magian thought.61
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Date/Time Last Modified: 6/18/2002 8:03:35 AM
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