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Is
Religion Possible?
Broadly speaking
religious life may be divided into three periods. These may be described as
the periods of ‘Faith’, ‘Thought’, and ‘Discovery.’
In the first period religious life appears as a form of discipline which the
individual or a whole people must accept as an unconditional command without
any rational understanding of the ultimate meaning and purpose of that command.
This attitude may be of great consequence in the social and political history
of a people, but is not of much consequence in so far as the individual’s
inner growth and expansion are concerned. Perfect submission to discipline is
followed by a rational understanding of the discipline and the ultimate source
of its authority. In this period religious life seeks its foundation in a kind
of metaphysics - a logically consistent view of the world with God as a part
of that view. In the third period metaphysics is displaced by psychology, and
religious life develops the ambition to come into direct contact with the Ultimate
Reality. It is here that religion becomes a matter of personal assimilation
of life and power; and the individual achieves a free personality, not by releasing
himself from the fetters of the law, but by discovering the ultimate source
of the law within the depths of his own consciousness. As in the words of a
Muslim Sufi - ‘no understanding of the Holy Book is possible until it is
actually revealed to the believer just as it was revealed to the Prophet.’1
It is, then, in the sense of this last phase in the development of religious
life that I use the word religion in the question that I now propose to raise.
Religion in this sense is known by the unfortunate name of Mysticism, which
is supposed to be a life-denying, fact-avoiding attitude of mind directly opposed
to the radically empirical outlook of our times. Yet higher religion, which
is only a search for a larger life, is essentially experience and recognized
the necessity of experience as its foundation long before science learnt to
do so. It is a genuine effort to clarify human consciousness, and is, as such,
as critical of its level of experience as Naturalism is of its own level.
As we all know,
it was Kant who first raised the question: ‘Is metaphysics possible?’2
He answered this question in the negative; and his argument applies with equal
force to the realities in which religion is especially interested. The manifold
of sense, according to him, must fulfil certain formal conditions in order to
constitute knowledge. The thing-in-itself is only a limiting idea. Its function
is merely regulative. If there is some actuality corresponding to the idea,
it falls outside the boundaries of experience, and consequently its existence
cannot be rationally demonstrated. This verdict of Kant cannot be easily accepted.
It may fairly be argued that in view of the more recent developments of science,
such as the nature of matter as ‘bottled-up light waves’, the idea
of the universe as an act of thought, finiteness of space and time and Heisenberg’s
principle of indeterminacy3 in Nature, the case for a system of rational
theology is not so bad as Kant was led to think. But for our present purposes
it is unnecessary to consider this point in detail. As to the thing-in-itself,
which is inaccessible to pure reason because of its falling beyond the boundaries
of experience, Kant’s verdict can be accepted only if we start with the
assumption that all experience other than the normal level of experience is
impossible. The only question, therefore, is whether the normal level is the
only level of knowledge-yielding experience. Kant’s view of the thing-in-itself
and the thing as it appears to us very much determined the character of his
question regarding the possibility of metaphysics. But what if the position,
as understood by him, is reversed? The great Muslim Sufi philosopher, Muhyaddin
Ibn al-‘Arabâ of Spain, has made the acute observation that God is a percept;
the world is a concept.4 Another Muslim Sufi thinker and poet, ‘Ir«qâ,
insists on the plurality of space-orders and time-orders and speaks of a Divine
Time and a Divine Space.5 It may be that what we call the external
world is only an intellectual construction, and that there are other levels
of human experience capable of being systematized by other orders of space and
time - levels in which concept and analysis do not play the same role as they
do in the case of our normal experience. It may, however, be said that the level
of experience to which concepts are inapplicable cannot yield any knowledge
of a universal character, for concepts alone are capable of being socialized.
The standpoint of the man who relies on religious experience for capturing Reality
must always remain individual and incommunicable. This objection has some force
if it is meant to insinuate that the mystic is wholly ruled by his traditional
ways, attitudes, and expectations. Conservatism is as bad in religion as in
any other department of human activity. It destroys the ego’s creative
freedom and closes up the paths of fresh spiritual enterprise. This is the main
reason why our medieval mystic techniques can no longer produce original discoveries
of ancient Truth. The fact, however, that religious experience is incommunicable
does not mean that the religious man’s pursuit is futile. Indeed, the incommunicability
of religious experience gives us a clue to the ultimate nature of the ego. In
our daily social intercourse we live and move in seclusion, as it were. We do
not care to reach the inmost individuality of men. We treat them as mere functions,
and approach them from those aspects of their identity which are capable of
conceptual treatment. The climax of religious life, however, is the discovery
of the ego as an individual deeper than his conceptually describable habitual
selfhood. It is in contact with the Most Real that the ego discovers its uniqueness,
its metaphysical status, and the possibility of improvement in that status.
Strictly speaking, the experience which leads to this discovery is not a conceptually
manageable intellectual fact; it is a vital fact, an attitude consequent on
an inner biological transformation which cannot be captured in the net of logical
categories. It can embody itself only in a world-making or world-shaking act;
and in this form alone the content of this timeless experience can diffuse itself
in the time-movement, and make itself effectively visible to the eye of history.
It seems that the method of dealing with Reality by means of concepts is not
at all a serious way of dealing with it. Science does not care whether its electron
is a real entity or not. It may be a mere symbol, a mere convention. Religion,
which is essentially a mode of actual living, is the only serious way of handing
Reality. As a form of higher experience it is corrective of our concepts of
philosophical theology or at least makes us suspicious of the purely rational
process which forms these concepts. Science can afford to ignore metaphysics
altogether, and may even believe it to be ‘a justified form of poetry’6,
as Lange defined it, or ‘a legitimate play of grown-ups’, as Nietzsche
described it. But the religious expert who seeks to discover his personal status
in the constitution of things cannot, in view of the final aim of his struggle,
be satisfied with what science may regard as a vital lie, a mere ‘as-if’7
to regulate thought and conduct. In so far as the ultimate nature of Reality
is concerned, nothing is at stake in the venture of science; in the religious
venture the whole career of the ego as an assimilative personal centre of life
and experience is at stake. Conduct, which involves a decision of the ultimate
fate of the agent cannot be based on illusions. A wrong concept misleads the
understanding; a wrong deed degrades the whole man, and may eventually demolish
the structure of the human ego. The mere concept affects life only partially;
the deed is dynamically related to Reality and issues from a generally constant
attitude of the whole man towards reality. No doubt the deed, i.e. the control
of psychological and physiological processes with a view to tune up the ego
for an immediate contact with the Ultimate Reality is, and cannot but be, individual
in form and content; yet the deed, too, is liable to be socialized when others
begin to live though it with a view to discover for themselves its effectiveness
as a method of approaching the Real. The evidence of religious experts in all
ages and countries is that there are potential types of consciousness lying
close to our normal consciousness. If these types of consciousness open up possibilities
of life-giving and knowledge-yielding experience, the question of the possibility
of religion as a form of higher experience is a perfectly legitimate one and
demands our serious attention.
But, apart
from the legitimacy of the question, there are important reasons why it should
be raised at the present moment of the history of modern culture. In the first
place, the scientific interest of the question. It seems that every culture
has a form of Naturalism peculiar to its own world-feeling; and it further appears
that every form of Naturalism ends in some sort of Atomism. We have Indian Atomism,
Greek Atomism, Muslim Atomism, and Modern Atomism.8 Modern Atomism
is, however, unique. Its amazing mathematics which sees the universe as an elaborate
differential equation; and its physics which, following its own methods, has
been led to smash some of the old gods of its own temple, have already brought
us to the point of asking the question whether the casualty-bound aspect of
Nature is the whole truth about it? Is not the Ultimate Reality invading our
consciousness from some other direction as well? Is the purely intellectual
method of overcoming Nature the only method? ‘We have acknowledged’,
says Professor Eddington,
‘that
the entities of physics can from their very nature form only a partial aspect
of the reality. How are we to deal with the other part? It cannot be said that
other part concerns us less than the physical entities. Feelings, purpose, values,
made up our consciousness as much as sense-impressions. We follow up the sense-impressions
and find that they lead into an external world discussed by science; we follow
up the other elements of our being and find that they lead - not into a world
of space and time, but surely somewhere.’9
In the second
place we have to look to the great practical importance of the question. The
modern man with his philosophies of criticism and scientific specialism finds
himself in a strange predicament. His Naturalism has given him an unprecedented
control over the forces of Nature, but has robbed him of faith in his own future.
It is strange how the same idea affects different cultures differently. The
formulation of the theory of evolution in the world of Islam brought into being
Rëmâ’s tremendous enthusiasm for the biological future of man. No cultured
Muslim can read such passages as the following without a thrill of joy:
Low in the
earth
I lived in realms of ore and stone;
And then I smiled in many-tinted flowers;
Then roving with the wild and wandering hours,
O’er earth and air and ocean’s zone,
In a new birth,
I dived and flew,
And crept and ran,
And all the secret of my essence drew
Within a form that brought them all to view -
And lo, a Man!
And then my goal,
Beyond the clouds, beyond the sky,
In realms where none may change or die -
In angel form; and then away
Beyond the bounds of night and day,
And Life and Death, unseen or seen,
Where all that is hath ever been,
As One and Whole.
(Rëmâ: Thadani’s
Translation)10
On the other
hand, the formulation of the same view of evolution with far greater precision
in Europe has led to the belief that ‘there now appears to be no scientific
basis for the idea that the present rich complexity of human endowment will
ever be materially exceeded.’ That is how the modern man’s secret
despair hides itself behind the screen of scientific terminology. Nietzsche,
although he thought that the idea of evolution did not justify the belief that
man was unsurpassable, cannot be regarded as an exception in this respect. His
enthusiasm for the future of man ended in the doctrine of eternal recurrence
- perhaps the most hopeless idea of immortality ever formed by man. This eternal
repetition is not eternal ‘becoming’; it is the same old idea of ‘being’
masquerading as ‘becoming.’
Page [1, 2]
[See
Notes]
Date/Time Last Modified: 6/18/2002 8:03:49 AM
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