|
Self-defence
and Security
By Anwar Ahmad
Last week, after Israeli
forces had assassinated yet another Palestinian who "Israel believed"
was "planning a new attack," prime minister Ariel Sharon said "This
is not the first and not the last" killing because "that is how we
will act." His spokesman, Raanan Gissin, warned that "we will exercise
our right of self-defence, just as the US is doing in Afghanistan." Brushing
aside US criticism of its assassinations policy by equating it with the American
hunt for OBL "dead or alive," Sharon's advisor, Zalman Shoval, said
"Actually we do the same thing they (the Americans) do and they do the
same thing we do." Indeed!
It was argued last week
that the UN Security Council's ambiguous resolutions on terrorism and the unilateral
US-UK attack on Afghanistan had combined to set a dangerous precedent for Israel
and India. In the context of Israel, as the Shoval hometruth underlines, it
is more accurate to say that the unfolding US anti-terrorism "crusade"
is but a glorified and globalised version of Israel's long-practiced policy
of demonising and killing the enemy without letting its side of the story enter
the public picture.
Hence, New York mayor Rudy
Giuliani's stinging rebuke to Saudi Prince Al-Waleed for daring to tag with
his 10 million dollar donation into the Twin Towers Fund a "highly irresponsible"
and "dangerous" plea that the US adopt a "balanced stance"
- not a pro-Arab stance - in Palestine. Whatever happens, the "cause"
must not find linkage with "terrorism" because that might set the
conditioned American mind thinking. That would be dangerous.
However, as the subsequent
assassination of Israel's ultra-hawkish minister, Rehavam Zeevi has underscored,
state-terrorism has not delivered peace or security to Israel. The wisdom of
the US wielding a sledgehammer against a "viral flue" has also been
questioned. Sadly, much more strife lies ahead before the two, and India, can
face the self-evident reality. As the US Secretary of State Colin Powell landed
in Pakistan, India capped its mounting post-September 11 sabre rattling by proclaiming
its attack on 11 Pakistan army posts on the LoC.
Such attacks are, of course,
common. What was new this time was India claiming credit for these, unlike the
standard practice of blaming the other side. "This is a punitive action
against Pakistan for arming and funding militants in Kashmir. This is to tell
them that they cannot go on with this anymore," said an Indian army commander
in occupied Kashmir.
Anymore? Why? What has changed
suddenly? Indians have been stridently citing the US precedent to invoke self-defence
in attacking Pakistan. Having acted the way they have, the UN and USA have both
forfeited the legal-moral authority to admonish others for unilateral cross-border
strikes against their "terrorists." It is now a free-for-all, and
a very dangerous one in the nuclearised and sanity-free South Asia.
When President Bush advised
Pakistan and India to "stand down during our activities in Afghanistan,
for that matter for ever," he erred in treating them at par even though
India had admitted its aggression. But given its doings in Afghanistan, the
US could not chastise India and it cannot, for the moment, antagonise Pakistan.
It has, thus, left its post-Afghanistan stance on Kashmir in a dangerous but
deliberate ambivalence - a misreading of which could encourage Indian adventurism.
The current Indian bellicosity
is not just customary pettiness and pique at America's reunion with Pakistan.
The Pak-US relationship, India knows well, is unlikely to outlast the present
crisis. In May this year, Richard Armitage, the US deputy secretary of state,
had chosen his first Indian visit to include Pakistan in the "rogues' gallery"
from whose "irresponsibility" the National Missile Defence would shield,
among other US allies, India.
Islamabad had then hummed
and hawed, without eliciting so much as a "clarification" from Washington.
In July, Armitage baldly described 50-years of Pak-US relations as "false"
- the first time such truth was officially spoken. "It's been a relationship
that wasn't based on Pakistan. It was based against someone else - in the first
instance India and their relationship with the Soviet Union, and later against
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan." The sudden swing in Pak-US relations
only proves Armitage's point.
Much has changed after September
11. But democracy, secularism and the market still make India and the US natural
allies. This relationship will be honourable because Indian democracy and freedom-from-debt
gives it the strength to deal with the US on an equal footing. That Secretary
Powell stood with Pakistan's president and India's foreign minister in addressing
the press is one reflection of US perception of the two countries.
Thus, even as the Indians
fumed at Pakistan slipping out of the noose, their former prime minister I K
Gujral was quick to point out that "it is an evolving situation."
Indeed, the US would return to India with full fervour after it has used Pakistan.
The Indian worry is that it may not jettison Pakistan. The animus in Pakistan
at being arm-twisted into being "friends" again, the suspicion of
being discarded again and the US confession that it had erred mightily by abandoning
Afghanistan and Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal have elicited US assurances
of an "enduring commitment" this time.
Few Pakistanis trust these
fidelity vows, especially since there is still no hint of the one litmus test
by which they will judge US sincerity - a loan write-off. In fact, many worry
that Pakistan could be the next US target. Even so, the Indians (and Israelis)
dread the thought of the US being eventually forced to focus on the causes of
"terrorism." The din in Delhi was, thus, intended primarily to drown
out Pakistani whispers into the American ears of its standard distinction between
terrorists and freedom-fighters.
By threatening to distract
world attention from the US "activities" in Afghanistan, India has
created bargaining chips where none seemed to exist. Unlike the misplaced chivalry
of the Pakistanis, the Indians are hardnosed bargainers and single-mindedly
focused on their strategic objectives. They would use their spoiler-value to
dissuade the US from making any promise to Pakistan on Kashmir, or even military
sales.
Simultaneously, while seeking
a US commitment to include Kashmiri resistance in its war against terrorism,
India would like the US to endorse its view that the Kashmir dispute does not
exist beyond its "terrorist" dimension. If this is granted, India
would feel freer to invoke self-defence in hitting the resistance bases in Azad
Kashmir. Like Israel's infamous invasion of Lebanon, it may also like to redo
the LoC to create a buffer-zone.
The Indians have succeeded
thus far in "inviting" Secretary Powell to the sub-continent, pushing
him back from Kashmir being "a central" issue between India and Pakistan
to an "important" one and inveigling an invitation for premier Vajpayee
to visit the US. Powell also repeated on the Indian soil the US commitment to
target terrorism of all kinds, including the one afflicting India. These commitments
would not have come had India not gone berserk.
But Pakistan can draw solace
from Powell's reiteration in India of Kashmir being an unresolved dispute and
the Kashmir-specific resistance groups evading the US list of terrorists. They
do not, in any case, qualify as "terrorists with a global reach" against
whom the US crusade is directed. But things will change and, too often in the
past, these have changed to Pakistan's detriment.
Nonetheless, as Pakistan
hopes for a debt write-off and a fair deal in Kashmir, and US must know that
another betrayal could become the epitaph of the liberal, perhaps even the moderate,
cause in Pakistan. That would create too many very obvious and ominous problems
for the US (and India) without solving any. Having destroyed Iraq and Afghanistan,
the already stretched US credibility will snap in selling Pakistan to the Muslim
world as another deserving target while arguing that the "crusade"
is not against Islam.
Which way the US bends in
the Pak-India and Arab-Israeli cross winds on terrorism and how its self-defence
Afghan war pans out should shape the new world, and determine its own shattered
security. Only if the US leaders find the vision and the courage to see and
redress state-terrorism, injustice, indignity and inequity as the main causes
of a militant backlash would the world become a safer place for all.
Date/Time Last Modified: 6/18/2002 8:05:47 AM
© 2004, Human Development
Foundation. All rights reserved.
1350 Remington Road, Suite W, Schaumburg, Il. 60173
Toll Free: (800) 705-1310 | Email: info@yespakistan.com
| Privacy Policy
|